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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4562 
_____________ 
 
WILLIAM M. DANIELS, JR., 
 
                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HARRY E. WILSON, Superintendent; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF 
ALLEGHENY; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:06-cv-00741-DSC-LPL) 
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2012 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., NYGAARD, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  December 12, 2012) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
I. 
 Appellant William Daniels, Jr. (“Daniels”) seeks review of the District Court 
Judge’s failure to recuse himself from consideration of Daniels’ petition for writ of 
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habeas corpus, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  A prior panel of this Court granted a 
Certificate of Appealability solely with regard to the issue of recusal, and denied a 
Certificate as to all remaining issues.  Daniels argues District Judge Cercone was required 
to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and that the only appropriate remedy for his 
failure to do so is to vacate the District Court’s Order denying Daniels’ habeas petition 
and to remand the matter to a different district judge.  After careful consideration of the 
parties’ arguments, we find that Judge Cercone did not err in failing to recuse himself, 
and we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the habeas petition in all respects.1
II.
  
2
 The facts are amply set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, which was adopted by Judge Cercone as the District Court’s opinion.  
The current appeal arises from Judge Cercone’s denial of Daniels’ petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.   
   
 From August 1995 until September 1996, Daniels was charged with several 
offenses in three separate criminal complaints, all based on a shooting which occurred on 
September 20, 1994.  Daniels failed to appear for a January 14, 1997 preliminary hearing 
for one of the three complaints.  As a result, on March 26, 1997, Judge David S. Cercone, 
then Administrative Judge for the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, issued a 
                                              
1 Because Judge Cercone did not err, we need not address Daniels’ argument regarding 
remedy.   
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, and 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  When a habeas petitioner seeks, for 
the first time on appeal, the recusal of the district judge presiding over his habeas 
proceeding, we review for plain error.  Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 
2004).   
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warrant for Daniels’ arrest.  A year later a Notification to Clear Warrant was issued under 
Judge Cercone’s authority because Daniels had been re-arrested and was in custody.3
 On September 24, 1998, Daniels was convicted after a jury trial.  Common Pleas 
Judge Gerard M. Bigley had presided over this trial and subsequently sentenced Daniels.
   
4  
Daniels filed a direct appeal, several petitions for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), and eventually a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
federal district court.  Daniels had initially filed his federal habeas petition before he had 
exhausted his state court remedies, and this habeas petition was stayed until his state 
proceedings had concluded.   In 2002 Judge Cercone was appointed a District Judge for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, and on November 6, 2009, he reopened Daniels’ 
habeas petition.  In his habeas petition, Daniels raised nine issues, none of which 
concerned the arrest warrant issued by then-state Judge Cercone, or the notification 
clearing the warrant.5
                                              
3 Both parties assert this was the full extent of Judge Cercone’s involvement in the 
matter, and the record provided us does not indicate otherwise.   
  The habeas petition was reviewed by federal Magistrate Judge 
4 The dockets for Daniels’ three cases indicate Judge Bigley had been handling the cases 
since as early as December 6, 1995, when he denied a state court petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  From that point on, Judge Bigley ruled on various motions of Daniels and 
his attorneys, and continued to handle the case through the PCRA stage.  It is clear he 
was the judge primarily, almost exclusively, responsible for the criminal proceedings 
against Daniels.   
5 These nine issues were:  1) A due process violation because the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence; 2) a due 
process violation because he was convicted on insufficient evidence; 3) a due process 
violation because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony; 4) a 
due process violation for holding juror misconduct was not a cognizable claim under the 
PCRA; 5) a due process violation from juror misconduct, police and prosecutorial 
misconduct, recantation evidence, and newly discovered evidence; 6) a due process 
violation entitling Appellant to a new trial based on after-discovered exculpatory 
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Lisa Pupo Lenihan.  On October 5, 2010, Magistrate Judge Lenihan issued a fifty-page 
Report and Recommendation, advising that Daniels’ habeas petition and request for a 
Certificate of Appealability be denied.  On November 17, 2010, Judge Cercone issued an 
order denying the habeas petition and the request for a Certificate of Appealability, and 
adopting the Report of Magistrate Judge Lenihan as the opinion of the court.    
III.   
 As previously noted, the sole issue on appeal is whether District Judge Cercone 
was required to recuse himself from presiding over Daniels’ habeas petition due to his 
involvement in the state court proceedings against Daniels.  Though this issue arises 
infrequently, this Court addressed a similar question in the past, and other circuits have as 
well.  We will first discuss the matter in relation to our precedent, and then consider it in 
light of the decisions of other Courts of Appeals.   
A.  Third Circuit precedent does not require recusal under Section 455(a) 
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  An objective standard is used to determine whether 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 
548 (1994).  It is irrelevant whether the judge was actually biased; the inquiry concerns 
whether a “reasonable person might perceive bias to exist.”  In re School Asbestos Litig., 
                                                                                                                                                  
evidence; 7) a violation of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel; 8) a due process violation based on the trial court’s 
granting of a Commonwealth motion to limit cross-examination of a Commonwealth 
witness; and 9) that claims based on “actual innocence” or “misconduct of justice” cannot 
be procedurally barred under the Eighth Amendment.   
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977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992); see also In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 220 
(3d Cir. 2003) (noting lack of actual bias is immaterial because § 455(a) “concerns the 
public’s confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is 
allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted.”).  Recusal is required if “a 
reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the 
judge’s impartiality.”  Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983)).   
    1. The Clemmons Decision 
 In Clemmons, we addressed a question similar to the one now before us.  In that 
case, the appellant had been convicted of first degree murder after a jury trial in state 
court.  Clemmons, 377 F.3d at 324.  Judge William Caldwell, at that point a state judge, 
had presided over appellant’s trial and had imposed his sentence.  Id.  The appellant 
eventually filed a federal habeas petition, which was assigned to Judge Caldwell, at this 
point a federal District Judge.  Id.  After Judge Caldwell denied appellant’s habeas 
petition, this Court addressed whether Judge Caldwell had been required to recuse 
himself under § 455(a) due to his involvement in the appellant’s state court proceedings.   
 In holding recusal was required, this Court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 47, which 
provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or 
issue tried by him,” and on two cases from other circuits.6
                                              
6 Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989) and Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th 
Cir. 1978).   
  Though § 47 was inapplicable 
because it applied only to cases on direct appeal, the Court recognized that a habeas 
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action provides the defendant with “federal court review [of] the state proceedings for 
constitutional infirmities.”  Id. at 325.  Therefore, “there is no reason why the same rules 
governing independence, conflict of interest, or appearance of partiality should not 
apply.”  Id. at 325-36.  This Court noted that a judge in Judge Caldwell’s situation “‘was 
being asked to find he had affirmed an unconstitutional conviction, and, implicitly, that 
by doing so he had become complicit in sending [petitioner] to prison in violation of 
[petitioner’s] constitutional rights.’”  Id. at 326 (alterations in original) (quoting Russell v. 
Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 1989)).  Relying on the “bedrock principle of a 
hierarchal judiciary” codified in § 47, the Court determined a reasonable person might 
doubt the impartiality of a judge “tasked with reviewing his past state court rulings in a 
federal habeas case.”  Id. at 325, 328.   
 The Court then enunciated a rule requiring7
that each federal district court judge in this circuit recuse 
himself or herself from participating in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
habeas corpus petition of a defendant raising any issue 
concerning the trial or conviction over which that judge 
presided in his or her former capacity as a state court judge.  
  
 
Id. at 329.  Therefore, the District Court’s order was vacated and the matter remanded to 
a different district judge.  Id.   
 
                                              
7 The Court relied on its supervisory powers over federal proceedings in enacting this 
rule.  Clemmons, 377 F.3d at 328-29 (citing e.g., Bartone v. United States, 573 U.S. 52, 
54 (1963)).  As this Court noted in Clemmons, we have used this power in the past.  Id. at 
328 n.4 (citing Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., 230 F.3d 600, 607-613 (3d Cir. 2000); Vadino v. A. 
Valey Eng’rs, 903 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 1990); Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. 
Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1982)).   
7 
 
   2. Application of Clemmons to the facts of this case 
 Though the language in the rule from Clemmons is broad, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that when a Court of Appeals is considering the necessity of a § 455(a) 
recusal, it cannot ignore the factual realities of the matter under review.  Thus in Sao 
Paulo State of the Federative Republic of Braz. v. Am. Tobacco Co., the Court reversed a 
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit because the court failed to take into 
consideration the facts that gave rise to the alleged appearance of impropriety.  535 U.S. 
229, 232-33 (2002) (per curiam).  The Court reiterated that, when applying the objective 
standard to determine whether “impartiality might be reasonably questioned,” the 
appellate court must consider what a reasonable person, “knowing all the circumstances,” 
would believe.  Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. at 232 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Therefore, we must balance the broad rule of Clemmons against the mandate of 
Am. Tobacco Co. that we not disregard the factual reality of the case before us.  Taking 
these both into account, we find Judge Cercone did not run afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or 
Clemmons.   
 Clemmons held § 455(a) recusal was required if the district judge was hearing a 
habeas petition “of a defendant raising any issue concerning the trial or conviction over 
which that judge presided in his or her former capacity as a state court judge.”  377 F.3d 
at 329.  Common Pleas Judge Cercone did not preside over any trial or conviction of 
Daniels, much less the one currently before us on appeal; that task was performed by 
Judge Gerard M. Bigley.  Judge Cercone, in his role as Administrative Judge, only issued 
a warrant for Daniels’ arrest when Daniels did not appear at a preliminary hearing.  The 
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warrant did not concern the substantive charges against Daniels; it only issued as a result 
of his failure to appear at the hearing, and nothing concerning this warrant was raised in 
Daniels’ habeas petition.   
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time mandated 
issuance of the warrant.  Under then-Rule 113,8 if a defendant failed to appear at his 
preliminary hearing, “the issuing authority shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the 
defendant.”  PA. R. CRIM. P. 512 (2001).9
 Even if the issuance of a bench warrant is considered analogous to a “trial” or 
“conviction,” Daniels is not “raising any issue concerning [that] trial or conviction.”  
None of the many issues Daniels raised in his habeas petition reference any conduct by 
Judge Cercone.  Appellant has had numerous opportunities to challenge then-state Judge 
Cercone’s arrest warrant; he could have done so on direct appeal, in state collateral 
  Therefore, the issuance of the arrest warrant 
was not discretionary; it was automatically issued when a defendant, such as Daniels, did 
not appear for his hearing.  Since Judge Cercone’s involvement in the state proceedings 
against Daniels was non-discretionary and ministerial, he did not preside over Daniels’ 
“trial or conviction.” 
                                              
8 This Rule had originally been adopted as Rule 113 on September 18, 1973, and was last 
amended on August 24, 2004.  PA. R. CRIM. P. 512 note.  However, the effective text of 
the Rule was the same from January 1, 1995 until August 1, 2005.  Id.  As of April 1, 
2001, the Rule was renumbered, from Rule 113 to Rule 512, but the language of the Rule 
remained the same.  Id.   
9 The “issuing authority” was defined as “any public official having the authority of a 
magistrate, a Philadelphia bail commissioner, or a district justice.”  PA. R. CRIM. P. 103 
(2001) This Rule has since been revised to reflect changes in terminology:  a “bail 
commissioner” is now an “arraignment court magistrate,” and a “district justice” is a 
“magisterial district judge.”  PA. R. CRIM. P. 103 cmt (2012). 
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proceedings, and in his federal habeas petition, but he has not.  Therefore, the concern 
upon which the Clemmons decision was based does not exist because Judge Cercone was 
not “tasked with reviewing his past state court rulings in a federal habeas case.”  
Clemmons, 377 F.3d at 328.    
As the Supreme Court made clear in Am. Tobacco Co., a party seeking recusal 
cannot make talismanic invocation of § 455(a)’s objective standard to obtain judicial 
disqualification.  The use of unsubstantiated allegations that a judge’s prior actions  “cast 
a cloud over the process and . . .  create the look of impropriety” will not overshadow the 
factual realities of the matter before us.  (Appellant’s Br. at 18).  And the factual reality is 
that Daniels was not “raising any issue concerning the trial or conviction over which” 
Judge Cercone “presided in his . . .  former capacity as a state court judge.”  Clemmons, 
377 F.3d at 329.  Therefore, Judge Cercone’s review of Daniels’ habeas petition did not 
“create[] an appearance of impropriety that runs the risk of undermining the public’s 
confidence in the judicial process.”    Id. at 328 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
A reasonable person, “knowing all the circumstances” would not doubt Judge Cercone’s 
impartiality in deciding Daniels’ habeas petition, and therefore recusal was not required.  
Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. at 232 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
B.  Precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided a situation analogous to the 
one before us.  In Tyler v. Purkett, the appellant had filed a federal habeas petition and 
was granted an evidentiary hearing, over which District Judge Gaitan presided.  413 F.3d 
696, 698, 704 (8th Cir. 2005).  On appeal, the appellant argued Judge Gaitan was 
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required to recuse himself because he had been a member of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals at the time the appellant had moved for a rehearing or transfer of his state court 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri.  Id. at 704.  Under Missouri Supreme Court 
Rules, a decision to transfer a case from the state court of appeals to the supreme court 
was based on whether the voting judges believed “the general interest or importance of a 
question involved in the case or for the purpose of reexamining existing law” mandated 
transfer, and was voted on by all members of the court.  Id. (quoting Miss. S. Ct. R. 
83.02).  The federal Court of Appeals noted Judge Gaitan’s vote as a state judge had 
nothing to do with the merits of the case, but only concerned whether he believed the 
appeal involved an interesting or important question of law.  Id. at 704-05.  The court 
determined that a judge’s opinion regarding the interest or importance of an issue in a 
case would not cause a reasonable person “to question a jurist’s impartiality as to the 
merits of the case.”  Id. at 705.  Therefore, there was no threat to the “appearance of 
impartiality.”  Id.   
 This case is more analogous to Tyler than Clemmons.  In Clemmons, the petitioner 
sought to have the District Judge find that he had imposed a conviction and sentence in 
violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.  As explained above, Judge Cercone was 
asked to do nothing of the sort when he reviewed Daniels’ habeas petition.  Rather, like 
Judge Gaitan in Tyler, his involvement concerned non-substantive matters that were more 
administrative in nature.  Similarly to the petitioner in Tyler, Daniels does not seek 
habeas relief from the results of Judge Cercone’s role in the state court proceedings.  Like 
Judge Gaitan’s vote on the state appellate court, the presence of Judge Cercone’s 
11 
 
signature on a bond forfeiture order and his typed name on an arrest warrant would not 
“lead a reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality” in deciding Daniels’ 
habeas petition.  Tyler, 413 F.3d at 704.   
IV. 
On August 11, 2011, a prior panel of this Court granted a Certificate of 
Appealability with regard to the issue of recusal and denied a certificate as to all 
remaining issues.  We have determined that recusal was not required and that the District 
Court properly adopted the Magistrate Judge’s opinion which, in turn, recommended 
denying the habeas petition in this case.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of the habeas petition in all respects.   
 
 
